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Examples | View the maps. | Map 1 | Map 2 | Map 3 | Map 4 | Map 5 | Map 6 | Map 7 | (large files!)
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Map 1: Can computers think?
Can computers have free will?
Can computers have emotions?
Can computers be creative?
Can computers understand arithmetic?
Can computers draw analogies?
Can computers be persons?
Is the brain a computer?
Can computers reason scientifically?
Are computers inherently disabled?
Should we pretend that computers will never be able to think?
Does God prohibit computers from thinking?

Map 2: Can the Turing test determine whether computers can think?
Is failing the test decisive?
Is passing the test decisive?
If a simulated intelligence passes, is it intelligent?
Have any machines passed the test?
Is the test, behaviorally or operationally construed, a legitimate intelligence test?
Is the test, as a source of inductive evidence, a legitimate intelligence test?
Is the neo-Turing test a legitimate intelligence test?
Does the imitation game determine whether computers can think?
Can the Loebner Prize stimulate the study of intelligence?
Other Turing test arguments

Map 3: Can physical symbol systems think?
Does thinking require a body?
Is the relation between hardware and software similar to that between human brains and minds?
Can physical symbol systems learn as humans do?
Can the elements of thinking be represented in discrete symbolic form?
Can symbolic representations account for human thinking?
Does the situated action paradigm show that computers can't think?
Can physical symbol systems think dialectically?
Can a symbolic knowledge base represent human understanding?
Do humans use rules as physical symbol systems do?
Does mental processing rely on heuristic search?
Do physical symbol systems play chess as humans do?
Other physical symbol systems arguments

Map 4: Can Chinese Rooms think?
Do humans, unlike computers, have intrinsic intentionality?
Is biological naturalism valid?
Can computers cross the syntax­semantics barrier?
Can learning machines cross the syntax­semantics barrier?
Can brain simulators think?
Can robots think?
Can a combination robot/brain simulator think?
Can the Chinese Room, considered as a total system, think?
Do Chinese Rooms instantiate programs?
Can an internalized Chinese Room think?
Can translations occur between the internalized Chinese Room and the internalizing English speaker?
Can computers have the right causal powers?
Is strong AI a valid category?
Other Chinese Room arguments

Map 5, Part 1: Can connectionist networks think?
Are connectionist networks like human neural networks?
Do connectionist networks follow rules?
Are connectionist networks vulnerable to the arguments against physical symbol systems?
Does the subsymbolic paradigm offer a valid account of connectionism?
Can connectionist networks exhibit systematicity?
Other connectionist arguments

Map 5, Part 2: Can computers think in images?
Can images be realistically represented in computer arrays?
Can computers represent the analogue properties of images?
Can computers recognize Gestalts?
Are images less fundamental than propositions?
Is image psychology a valid approach to mental processing?
Are images quasi-pictorial representations?
Other imagery arguments

Map 6: Do computers have to be conscious to think?
Can computers be conscious?
Is consciousness necessary for thought?
Is the consciousness requirement solipsistic?
Can higher-order representations produce consciousness?
Can functional states generate consciousness?
Does physicalism show that computers can be conscious?
Does the connection principle show that consciousness is necessary for thought?

Map 7: Are thinking computers mathematically possible?
Is mechanistic philosophy valid?
Does Gödel's theorem show that machines can't think?
Does Gödel's theorem show that machines can't be conscious?
Do mathematical theorems like Gödel's show that computers are intrinsically limited?
Does Gödel's theorem show that mathematical insight is non-algorithmic?
Can automata think?
Is the Lucas argument dialectical?
Can improved machines beat the Lucas argument?
Is the use of consistency in the Lucas argument problematic?
Other Lucas arguments