6-40 Computationalism contradicts itself.
. . . is disputed by . . .
6-43 The conscious computers would be so complex that there would be differences between them.
The claim (Anticipated by Tim Maudlin, 1989)
The conscious computers would be so complex that there would be
differences between them. Because the computers needed to instantiate
a consciousness program would in reality be so large and complex,
there would have to be differences in the physical activity between
the 2 systems. The supervenience thesis wouldn't be violated then,
because the physical activity underpinning the conscious system
and nonconscious system would be different.
Because the computers needed to instantiate a consciousness program would be so large and complex in reality, there would have to be physical-activity differences between the two systems. The supervenience thesis wouldn't be violated then, since the physical activity underpinning the conscious system and non-conscious system would be different. Computationalism is not self-contradictory.
The argument as anticipated by Maudlin
Maudlin writes: "To avoid getting bogged down in general
claims, let us look more closely at the details of Olympia, and
at the sorts of changes which are sufficient to defeat the support
of counterfactuals provided by the blocked machinery. Above we
considered the cases of Olympia running with and without the idle
machinery present. Because of the immense quantity of machinery
involved, one might misgive that its removal would necessitate
some considerable change in the physical happenings associated
with the machine. " p.425
References
Maudlin, Tim. 1989. Computation and Consciousness. The Journal
of Philosophy, vol. LXXXVI, no. 8. p. 407-432.
Links
is disputed by 6-44 Block in the cog.