6-41 Causal interaction necessary for consciousness.
. . . is disputed by . . .
6-42 Adding causal input doesn't create consciousness.
The claim (Selmer Bringsjord, 1992)
Adding causal input doesn't create consciousness. Imagine that
the input to Maudlin's water computer machine comes from the external
world by way of a Norwegian with a watering hose. It seems unlikely
that the Norwegian's input could make the otherwise unconscious
machine conscious.
Suppose Maudlin's consciousness computing machine were the size of Gigantor (-> ?) and input from the external world comes by way of a Norwegian with a watering hose. The addition of the Norwegian's input cannot make the otherwise unconscious machine conscious.
The Bringsjord argument
Bringsjord counters with: "I still think Maudlin's argument
survives, but for reasons he may find unpalatable. . . . Let's
suppose that the scale of [Maudlin's machine] has been changed
considerably -- so that [it] is also laid out across an
expanse as large as the state of Texas. . . . Let's suppose, furthermore,
that the Norwegians are going to handle things . . . . Yet another
Norwegian . . . walks by each trough, . . . and they're going
to follow watering instructions that represent programs. The large
scale that we've now adopted makes scrutinizing this trio of machines
easy. Imagine walking through their constituents while traveling
through and over the American Southwest. (Texas alone will no
longer suffice. We need Arizona and New Mexico for our trio.)
. . . . [The machines]'s input is in a rather constant state of
flux, because in addition to a Norwegian in charge of following
watering instructions in relation to what she finds in a trough,
there will be another Norwegian with a hose bringing in "input"
from the external environment. . . . Are we really to believe
that [the] sensor Norwegian makes all the difference in the world?
. . . . Isn't this rather hard to swallow?" (S. Bringsjord,
1992, pp. 229-30).
References
Bringsjord, Selmer. 1992. What Robots Can and Can't Be.
Boston: Kluwer.