6-40 Computationalism contradicts itself.
. . . is disputed by . . .
6-41 Causal interaction necessary for consciousness.
The claim (Eric Barnes, 1991)
Neither of the imagined machines is conscious, because neither
of them can causally interact with the environment. According
to the computationalists, causal interaction is a necessary component
for any model of consciousness. For example, the text of a book
must causally stimulate the reader in some way for it to be true
that the reader is actually reading the book (coincidentally verbalizing
the same words as those in an open book while dreaming with one's
eyes open doesn't count as reading).
The object of any cognitive act must play a causally active role for it to be true that one cognizes that object. For example, the text of a book must stimulate the reader in some way for it to be true that the reader is actually reading the book (coincidentally verbalizing the same words as those in an open book while dreaming with one's eyes open doesn't count).
The Barnes argument
Barnes writes, "One cannot read a text, I am claiming, when
one's sensory organs are are dormant and unstimulated any more
than one can ride a bicycle when the muscles of one's limbs are
dormant and unstimulated. The causally active role of the text
in the causal history of the subject's verbal activity is simply
essential for the subject to be reading the text; where this condition
is not met, the subject is not reading the text even when the
GAA [generally appropriate activity condition for computation]
condition for reading is met by this subject, and thus even when
the subject's verbal activity is identical to what it would have
been had the subject actually read the text" (E. Barnes,
1991, p. 313).
References
Barnes, Eric. 1991. The causal history of computationalism. The
Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXXVIII, no. 6. p. 304-316.
Links
is disputed by 6-42 Adding causal input
doesn't create consciousness.