6-39 Computationalism.
. . . is disputed by . . .
6-40 Computationalism contradicts itself.
The claim (Tim Maudlin, 1989)
Imagine 2 machines are engaged in the same physical activity and
are running the same consciousness program. One of these machines
supports counterfactual states, whereas the other doesn't. The
computationalist must claim, based on the nontriviality condition,
that the machine capable of supporting counterfactual states is
conscious and the other isn't. But this contradicts the supervenience
thesis: each machine exhibits the same physical activity, but
according to computationalism only one is conscious.
Note: The machines Maudlin describes are actually complex systems
of water troughs, hoses, chains, and pipes.
Running a program is not enough to create a conscious mental state, i.e, computationalism is false. We can see that it's false by proving it self-contradictory with an imagined counter-example. It's easy to imagine two machines with identical physical activity running a "consciousness program," one of which supports counterfactual states, while the other doesn't. The computationalist must claim, based on the Non-triviality condition, that one is conscious and the other isn't. But this contradicts the supervenience thesis.
The Maudlin argument
Maudlin writes, "The burden of the remainder of this essay
will be to demonstrate that the sufficiency condition, the necessity
condition, and the supervenience thesis form an inconsistent triad,
and hence that an acceptable computational theory of consciousness
is not possible" (T. Maudlin, 1989, p. 413).
Maudlin describes the contradiction as follows: "In short, the computationalist is committed to the claims that the armature moving without the extra machinery hooked up cannot be conscious and that the system composed of the armature moving with the machinery hooked up must be conscious. But the physical activities that occur with and without the idle machinery connected are exactly identical, so these two claims contradict the supervenience thesis" (T. Maudlin, 1989, p. 423).
References
Maudlin, Tim. 1989. Computation and consciousness.The Journal
of Philosophy, vol. LXXXVI, no. 8, pp. 407-432.
Links
is disputed by 6-41 Causal interaction
necessary for consciousness.
is disputed by 6-43 The conscious computers
would be so complex that there would be differences between them.
is disputed by 6-45 Reject supervenience.
is disputed by 6-47 The physical activity
is different in each system.