6-28 Consciousness can be implemented in a functional system.
. . . is supported by . . .
6-32 Consciousness is multiply realizable.
The claim (Hilary Putnam, 1967)
A given mental state may be realized in a multiplicity of mediums,
because only the functional organization of the system counts,
not the medium in which it's instantiated. Note: Also, see the
"Is the brain a computer?" arguments on Map 1, and sidebar,
"Formal Systems: An Overview," on Map 7.
A given mental state could be realized in a multiplicity of mediums, since only the functional organization of the system counts, not the medium in which it's instantiated.
The Putnam argument
Putnam argues, "Consider what the brain-state theorist has
to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical-chemical
state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if
and only if (a) it possesses a brain of a suitable physical-chemical
structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical-chemical state.
This means that the physical-chemical state in question must be
a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusk's
brain (octopuses are molluscks, and certainly feel pain), etc.
At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible)
state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot
feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be nomologically
certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extra-terrestrial
life that may be found that will be capable of feeling pain before
we can even entertain the supposition that it may be pain"
(H. Putnam, 1967, pp. 200-201).
References
Putnam, Hilary. 1967. Psychological Predicates. In Art, Mind,
and Religion, edited by W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill, pp.
37-48. Reprinted as "The nature of mental states" in
The Nature of Mind , edited by D. Rosenthal, 1991, pp.
197-203.
Links
is disputed by 6-33 Absent qualia problem.