6-02 Computers can't be conscious.

. . . is disputed by . . .

6-28 Consciousness can be implemented in a functional system.

The claim
Consciousness can be implemented in a functional system. Properly organized functional states generate consciousness. Such organization exists in the brain but can be built into computers as well. Conscious mental states, like all mental states, are best understood as states with characteristic functional roles; similarly, a mousetrap is really a mousetrap because of the function it serves, not because of any particular material, shape, or parts it might have.

Links
is supported by 6-29 The fading qualia thought experiment.
is supported by 6-32 Consciousness is multiply realizable.
is supported by 6-38 Machine functionalism.
is supported by 6-39 Computationalism.
is disputed by 6-49 Consciousness is an information bearing medium.

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