6-02 Computers can't be conscious.
. . . is supported by . . .
6-07 The meaning of 'machine' excludes consciousness.
The claim (Jonathan Cohen, 1955)
The word "machine" excludes not only all things that
can live or die but specifically all things capable of being conscious
or unconscious, because that is part of the meaning of "machine."
Any attempt to cross-pollinate the categories of "conscious
things" and "machines" violates their inherent
meanings.
'Machine,' as a category term, excludes not only all things that can be dead or alive but specifically all things capable of being conscious or unconscious, because that is part of the meaning of 'machine'. Any attempt to cross-pollinate that categories of 'conscious things' and 'machines' would violate the inherent meanings in the terms.
The Cohen argument
Cohen says, "Of course, it makes sense to ask whether a robot
could duplicate all forms of human behavior and sensitivity, and
this is a legitimate problem for cyberneticists to discuss. But
to have a mind of one's own entails a capacity for consciousness,
only living things can have conscious and unconscious states,
and 'machines do not even belong to the category of things
which can be dead or alive'. Hence we have a paradox to puzzle
us. 'On the one hand it does not seem that there is anything in
the construction, constituents or behavior of the human being
which it is essentially impossible for science to duplicate or
synthesize. On the other hand there seems to be some important
and meaningful descriptions of human behavior which can never
be properly applied to machines.' And we resolve the paradox by
coming to understand both these apparently conflicting truths
well enough to recognize that they do not really conflict"
(J. Cohen, 1955, p. 37).
References
Cohen, Jonathan. 1955. Can there be artificial minds? Analysis
Vol. 16, No. 2, Dec. 1955. pp. 36-41.
Links
is disputed by 6-08 Claiming analytic
falsity requires seeing into the future.